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何其春:Inflation and Growth: The Role of Central Bank Independence

作者:来源: 阅读次数:日期:2016-09-13

讲座题目:Inflation and Growth: The Role of Central Bank Independence
主讲人:何其春 中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院副教授
讲座时间:2016年9月28日 10:00-11:30
讲座地点:学术会堂606会议室  

主讲人简介:
何其春,中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院副教授。何其春副教授在北京大学获得城市规划专业学士后,因对经济学的严谨和中国经济发展的兴趣,转攻经济学,并于加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学获得经济学博士学位。回国后一直从事经济增长和中国经济的研究(兼顾理论与实证),喜欢教学,并喜欢思考中国近代落后的根源与将来中国成功之道。作为存身之本,发表了十几篇SSCI论文和几篇中文顶尖期刊论文。目前仍然努力思考和创作中,希望能够取得更好的发表,并为中华崛起和真正的繁荣贡献自己的绵薄之力。  

讲座内容介绍:
This paper reexamines the relationship between inflation and growth. We find strong evidence of a positive interaction effect between inflation and central bank independence in promoting economic growth, using data on OECD countries. We develop a model where the share of the seigniorage revenue from inflation used in non-productive government consumption (the grabbing hand) is decreased by a higher degree of central bank independence. A larger amount of seigniorage revenue grabbed by the government would hire away more labor from entrepreneurs, decreasing growth. The higher the degree of central bank independence is, the lower the share of the seigniorage revenue that would be kept by the government. As a result, more labor would be employed in R&D, which would increase growth. Therefore, the marginal effect of inflation on growth depends positively on the degree of central bank independence.
 

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