讲座主题：Information Acquisition and Price Discrimination in Two-sided Duopoly Markets
嘉宾简介：郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院副教授， Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编。研究领域为信息经济学、产业经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学。研究成果发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。
内容摘要：In this paper, we study platforms' information acquisition incentive and pricing strategy in a two-sided duopoly market. In stage 1, each platform decides whether to acquire information regarding consumers' preferences, which are characterized by the location of the consumer in a Hotelling setting. If a platform decides not to acquire information, its pricing strategy in the next stage will be uniform pricing. If a platform decides to acquire information, it can adopt a third-degree price discrimination, based on the acquired information, whose precision measured by the information partition is exogenously given. In stage 2, both platforms set their own prices based on the type of the pricing strategy. We characterize the equilibrium of the game, and show how precision of information affects platforms' incentive of information acquisition and the equilibrium outcome. We also conduct welfare analysis.