讲座主题：The Design of Quality Disclosure Policy and the Limits to Competition

主讲嘉宾：杨仁琨 暨南大学经济学院经济系助理教授

讲座时间：2026年10月20日（周二）下午14:30-17:00

讲座地点：腾讯会议：648-708-184

嘉宾简介：杨仁琨，暨南大学经济学院助理教授，博士毕业于俄亥俄州立大学经济学系，本科毕业于北京大学元培学院。从事微观经济理论研究，包括信息设计、机制设计、产业组织理论与数字经济，研究成果发表于《经济学（季刊）》、Journal of Mathematical Economics等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。曾获广东省高校青年教师教学大赛一等奖。

内容摘要：We study the design of quality disclosure policies in a duopoly market, where firms compete after consumers observe the publicly disclosed quality signals. We consider all objective functions expressed as weighted sums of consumer surplus and industry profits and demonstrate how the optimal disclosure policy varies with the welfare weight. The industry-optimal and surplus-maximizing policies coincide: both reveal only the quality ranking, thereby amplifying quality differentiation, mitigating competition, and improving consumer-product matching. In contrast, the consumer-optimal policy conceals the ranking, thereby maximizing competition. For intermediate weights, full revelation or partitions combining full revelation with ranking or concealment may be optimal.